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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON WAIVER
AND REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF M R S .
ROBERTS ON QUIET TITLE.

The trial court found that "the fence between the Roberts and Russell was not on
the boundary line, but encroached upon the Roberts' property by up to 14.5 feet." (R. at
679.) This finding is sufficient to establish a prima facie case for quiet title. Dr. Russell
did not assert any affirmative defenses against this claim at trial (R. at 683), and he does
not attempt to do so now. Therefore, if this Court reverses the trial court's ruling on
waiver, it would be appropriate to instruct the trial court to enter judgment quieting title
of the disputed property in favor of Mrs. Roberts. See United States v. 449 Cases, 212
F.2d 567, 573 (2nd Cir. 1954) (holding that an appellate court can instruct the district
court to enter judgment when it appears that the findings of fact support it); John Wagner
Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1133 (Utah App. 1990) ("Based on the
uncontested facts, we remand and instruct the trial court to find for Wagner.").
A.

The trial court erred in concluding that the Roberts had waived their
claim for quiet title.

In her opening brief, Mrs. Roberts gives five separate grounds as to why the trial
court erred when it concluded that Mr. Roberts waived the Roberts' claim for quiet title
in his trial testimony: first, the statement did not evince a clear and unequivocal intent to
waive a right; second, he had no authority to unilaterally waive the claim without Mrs.
Roberts' consent; third, Mr. Roberts could not waive the claim by his trial testimony, as
such an act could only be accomplished by a motion made by the Roberts' counsel;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fourth, that the trial court's finding of waiver was an impermissible amendment of the
pleadings; and fifth, that there was no basis to support the application of waiver, as there
was no consideration or detrimental reliance on Dr. Russell's part. Mrs. Roberts will not
rehash these arguments, but will simply answer Dr. Russell's responses.
With respect to the question of whether Mr. Roberts' statement manifested an
unequivocal intent to waive his claim, Dr. Russell merely states that Mr. Roberts stated
that "his only concern in this lawsuit was from his house 'going east.'" (Br. Appellee 11.)
He does not address the fact that Mr. Roberts' statement was made in the context of the
road to the west of his house, not the fence, or that the subject of the question was the
Roberts' claim against the Purkeys, not Dr. Russell, or any of the circumstances brought
up in Mrs. Roberts' opening brief that suggested that there was no intentional waiver. The
context of the statement simply does not support intentional and unequivocal waiver of
the Roberts' claim against Dr. Russell.
With regard to the question of whether Mrs. Roberts' approval would be required
to effectuate a waiver, Dr. Russell argues that Mrs. Roberts did not repudiate Mr.
Roberts' supposed waiver. However, he fails to give any reason or cite to any authority
that would indicate that Mrs. Roberts had "some duty or obligation to speak" that would
form the basis for a waiver based on silence. See Soter 's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. &
Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). Also, Dr. Russell does not dispute that Mr.
Roberts had no authority to waive Mrs. Roberts' rights with respect to the claim for quiet
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title. Because Mr. Roberts could not waive the claim for quiet title without the consent of
Mrs. Roberts, any such waiver would be ineffective.1
With respect to Mrs. Roberts' argument that voluntary dismissal of a pending
claim must come through a motion made by counsel and the order of the court "upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper," see Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a), Dr.
Russell does not dispute that a client represented by counsel cannot move to dismiss its
action and that such a motion must come through counsel. Instead, Dr. Russell states that
"a court may dismiss a claim sua sponte, without a motion by the defendant." (Br.
Appellee 14.) This statement is non-responsive. First, Dr. Russell cites Rule 41(b), which
deals with involuntary dismissals, while a dismissal under these facts would be voluntary.
As a waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, looking to the rule for
involuntary dismissals makes no sense. Second, Rule 41(b) provides specific grounds for
dismissing the action sua sponte. None of these grounds were cited by the trial court. As
the alleged waiver was not submitted through counsel, by motion, the trial court
improperly dismissed the Roberts' cause of action for quiet title.
Finally, with respect to the question of whether the court's determination of
waiver was an improper amendment, Dr. Russell argues that because "Mr. Roberts'
waiver took place at the trial of this matter . . . , Dr. Russell could not have anticipated [it]
1. In his brief, Dr. Russell suggests that he and Mrs. Roberts are now co-tenants. This
misunderstands both the nature of the right that the trial court concluded was waived, and
the legal effect of the trial court's decision. First, the trial court did not claim that Mr.
Roberts waived his rights to the property. Rather, the trial court concluded that he had
waived his claims against Dr. Russell for quiet title. (R. at 679, 683; Tr.2 50:16-18.)
Second, a waiver is not a conveyance, and cannot be the basis for severance of a joint
tenancy. There was no severance and Dr. Russell has no present interest in the subject
property under the trial court's ruling.
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and therefore could not properly plead the affirmative defense of waiver prior to the trial
of this matter." (Br. Appellee 14.) This statement supports Mrs. Roberts' argument that
Dr. Russell took no action in reliance on the waiver and therefore the trial court erred in
not allowing the Roberts to withdraw the waiver. This statement also contradicts his
argument that the Roberts' failure to object to his "testimony regarding his understanding
of the location of the property boundary line and Roberts' past conduct which implied the
correct location of the fence in question" supports the conclusion that waiver was tried by
implied consent. (Br. Appellee 15.) Dr. Russell does not explain what testimony about
events prior to the trial would have to do with the alleged waiver, which happened at the
trial. Moreover, Dr. Russell's argument that the issue of waiver was tried by implied
consent misses the point. Even if the trial court believed that there was implied consent to
tiy the issue, the trial court would still have to consider the issue of prejudice to the
Roberts before amending the pleadings, and allow a continuance so that the Roberts
could meet the new defense. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). Because Dr. Russell did not rely
upon the waiver and the trial court did not allow the Roberts to refute the waiver, the trial
court erred in concluding that the claim against Dr. Russell was waived.
B.

Whether Mr. Roberts' statement waived the Roberts' claim for quiet title
against Dr. Russell is a question of law reviewedfor correctness.

Dr. Russell also points out that Mrs. Roberts did not marshal all the evidence in
support of the trial court's judgment. However, a party is only required to marshal the
evidence in favor of a challenged factual finding, not a challenged conclusion of law. See
Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, Tf 17 n.4, 994 P.2d 193. As Mrs. Roberts notes in her
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opening brief, since the issues raised in this appeal are questions of law, the marshaling
requirement does not apply. (See Br. Appellant 1-2).
This Court has previously noted the difficulty of articulating the standard of
review with respect to mixed questions of law and fact such as waiver. See State v. Vigil,
815 P.2d 1296, 1298-1300 (Utah App. 1991) (determining the proper standard of review
for whether consent to search was voluntary). This Court analyzed this question based on
the core functions of trial and appellate courts, noting that "the trial judge is in the best
position to sift witness credibility and the accuracy of conflicting evidence," and that
"collegial appellate courts" are in the best position to resolve "legal conclusions and
ultimate facts." Id at 1299. Ultimately, this Court concluded that
the determinant factor in selecting the proper standard of appellate review
for mixed questions of law and fact is whether the first step—elucidation of
historical facts—or the second step—correct application of the proper rule
of law—is challenged on appeal. While we normally do not intrude on the
trial court's resolution in the first step, we independently assess the legal
conclusions generated in the second step for correctness.
M a t 1300.
In this case, the facts upon which the waiver is based are not in dispute and plain
from the record. There are no issues of credibility or conflicting evidence for the trial
court to weigh. Therefore, the question presented in this matter is a pure question of law.2

2. See In re Estate ofUzelac, 2005 UT App 234, ^ 10, 114 P.3d 1164 (when the facts
constituting the waiver are not in dispute, waiver is a question of law); B.R. Woodward
Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah App. 1988) ("In
this case, the material facts concerning Woodward's conduct... are undisputed.
However, Woodward claims that its conduct does not compel the conclusion, as a matter
of law, that it waived its right to compensation under the agreement."); Vessels Oil & Gas
Co. v. Coastal Refining & Marketing, Inc., 764 P.2d 391, 392 (Colo. App. 1988)
("Where . . . the facts are uncontested and the evidence before the trial court is entirely
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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C

Mrs. Roberts fulfilled the marshaling requirement in her opening brief.

Furthermore, Mrs. Roberts has adequately marshaled the evidence supporting
waiver in her opening brief. "In order to properly discharge the marshaling duty," an
appellant must present all of the evidence that supports the findings that the appellant
challenges, and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" to show why that evidence
does not support the conclusion. Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse,
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). While Mrs. Roberts did not specifically
identify her efforts as "marshaling the evidence," she has fulfilled the substance of both
requirements and has adequately discharged her marshaling duty. See id. at 1053-54
(clarifying the purposes of the marshaling requirement).
Mrs. Roberts presented all of the relevant evidence in support of the trial court's
finding of waiver. In its written rulings, the trial court is clear that the "evidence"3 it
relied upon to make its determination of waiver consisted of Mr. Roberts' response to the
documentary, the waiver issue becomes a matter of law, and we are not bound by the trial
court's findings."); see also Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680
P.2d 1235, 1240-41 (Ariz. App. 1984) (whether a letter constituted a repudiation of a
contract is a question of law); Nuco Plastics, Inc. v. Universal Plastics, Inc., 601 N.E.2d
152, 154-55 (Ohio App. 1991) ("However, whether the actions of appellant, which are
facts to be found by the trial court, constitute a repudiation of the contract is a question of
law.").
3. Calling Mr. Roberts' answer to the trial court's question evidence of waiver is a
misclassification. Evidence is "something that tends to prove or disprove the existence of
an alleged fact." Black's Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed. 1999). Words that have a legal
effect, such as entering into an oral contract, are not evidence; rather, they are verbal acts.
See John C Cutler Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 279 P.2d 700, 706 (Utah 1955) (Wade, J.,
concurring). Just as a written, executed contract is not "evidence" of a contract, Mr.
Roberts' statement either constituted a waiver or it did not, but it is not "evidence" of a
waiver, and the issue of weighing credibility does not come into play. See id. (explaining
that verbal acts are not testimonial evidence).
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trial court's questioning. (See R. at 679 fl[ 15); 880 fl[ 3).) Dr. Russell concedes this in his
brief (see Br. Appellee 7-8, 10-11) and does not identify any other evidence in support of
waiver that Mrs. Roberts failed to marshal. When a party shows that certain facts were
not relied upon by the trial court in making its decision, those facts are not relevant and
do not need to be marshaled. Taylor v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 331,^8,

P.3d

;

Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, ^ 21, 57 P.3d 1093. Further, Mrs. Roberts has pointed out
the fatal flaw in this evidence by showing that, in context, Mr. Roberts' statement was not
meant to apply to the claim for quiet title against Dr. Russell.
However, if this Court determines that Mrs. Roberts was deficient in any duty she
may have had to marshal the evidence, it does not follow that "this Court should decline
the Appellant's request to overturn the District Court's rulings in this matter." (Br.
Appellee 9.) While parties are obligated to marshal the evidence supporting a challenged
finding, this Court "retains discretion to consider independently the whole record and
determine if the decision below has adequate factual support." Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, \ 20, 164 P.3d
384. Because this case deals with a narrow issue, the relevant portion of the record is not
voluminous, and there is adequate citations and references to all of the evidence in Mrs.
Roberts' opening brief, the Court would not become "a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research." See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d
487,491 (Utah App. 1992). Mrs. Roberts therefore requests that the Court decide the
issues presented by this appeal, and to excuse any non-compliance as non-substantial.
Finally, even if the Court were to decline to review the question of whether Mr. Roberts
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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intended to waive the cause of action for quiet title against Dr. Russell, there is still the
question of whether the waiver is legally effective. As shown supra, it is not. Therefore,
this Court should reverse the trial court's conclusion of waiver and direct the trial court to
enter an order quieting title of the disputed property to Mrs. Roberts.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON TRESPASS
AND REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MRS.
ROBERTS.

Dr. Russell's brief on this point simply recites the trial court's conclusions and
fails to respond to any of Mrs. Roberts' arguments against those conclusions. Therefore,
Mrs. Roberts stands on the arguments made in her opening brief. The trial court' finding
that Dr. Russell's fence is encroaching on the Roberts' property (R. at 679) is sufficient
for this Court to reverse and instruct the trial court to enter a judgment ordering Dr.
Russell to cease trespassing by removing his fence from the Roberts' property.
III.

THE COURT SHOULD REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AWARD MRS. ROBERTS
HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AS PER THE OCTOBER 14, 2009
ORDER.

Because the Roberts proved their prima facie case for quiet title and trespass
against Dr. Russell in this matter and Dr. Russell did not plead or prove any affirmative
defense, Dr. Russell did not prevail in his defense and so Mrs. Roberts is entitled to her
reasonable attorney fees from May 27,2009 to the present. Dr. Russell makes two points,
which are addressed below.
First, Dr. Russell states that "this matter does not fall under any previously
recognized exception to the general rule against awarding attorney fees in tort cases.
Moreover, [Appellant] has cited no statutory reference to guide this court in awarding
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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attorney fees." (Br. Appellee 17.) This is false. As stated in pages 5 and 25 of Mrs.
Roberts' opening brief, the award of attorney fees is authorized by the lower court's order
of October 14, 2009, which provided as a condition of setting aside the judgment that "if
Cross-Defendant does not prevail in his defense, Cross-Claimants shall be entitled to
their reasonable attorney's fees from . . . May 27, 2009." (R. at 395.) A trial court can set
reasonable conditions for setting aside a judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (allowing the
court to set aside judgments "upon such terms as are just"); Powerserve InVl v Lavi, 239
F.3d 508, 515 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("In determining whether to exercise its discretion to set
aside a default, a district court has inherent power to impose a reasonable condition on
the vacatur in order to avoid undue prejudice to the opposing party."); Thorpe v. Thorpe,
364 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("In granting a motion to vacate a default judgment
the District Court may impose reasonable conditions."); 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 713
(2011); see also Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (recognizing a
district court's inherent authority to award attorney fees). Dr. Russell did not raise the
issue of the reasonableness of the trial court's order below, nor does he attempt to argue
this now.
Second, Dr. Russell states that the trial court "found that no party prevailed in this
litigation .. .." (Br. Appellee 17.) This is not exactly true—the trial court did not/zra/that
no party prevailed, rather the trial court made this is a conclusion of law. The Roberts'
point in bringing up this issue is that the trial court's conclusion was in error. While it is
true that "trial courts apply a flexible and reasoned approach to the determination of who
prevailed at trial," Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, ^ 13, 178 P.3d 922, this
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discretion is not without bounds. Based on the language and purpose of the Court's
previous order, the failure of Dr. Russell to provide any affirmative defense, and the
Roberts successfully proving their prima facie case for quiet title and trespass, for the
trial court to say that Dr. Russell had "prevailed in his defense" was an abuse of
discretion.4 This Court should reverse and instruct the trial court to determine an
appropriate award of attorney fees in this matter, including attorney fees expended on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's
decision and remand for a new trial in this matter, and for an order of attorney fees and
costs expended on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 2011.
/S/ Nathan Whittaker
Nathan Whittaker
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

4. Again, Mrs. Roberts met whatever marshaling burden that she may have had in
her opening brief. "Prevailing in the litigation" is either a conclusion of law or an
ultimate fact; either one is subject to de novo review. See Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1299. Mrs.
Roberts reviewed both findings of fact that could have led to this conclusion—the court's
sua sponte finding of waiver and the fact that the boundary was not off by 32 feet as
stated in the cross-complaint—and showed why they were not sufficient grounds for the
trial court to conclude that Dr. Russell had prevailed in his defense. (See Br. Appellant
25-26; 25 n.8.)
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